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Article 3

Commentary
Blind Umpires-A Response to

Professor Resnik
By STEVEN FLANDERS*

Professor Judith Resnik has issued a "proclamation of change"'an attack on judicial management of civil cases that asserts that the
character of the judiciary has been fundamentally altered for the worse.
Referring especially to the federal judiciary, 2 Resnik argues that new
managerial responsibilities have led many judges to abandon the disinterested stance that is the essence of the judicial role.3 In a turgid and
tendentious piece of writing that is riddled with errors in both its logic
and its scholarship, she appears to assert that "a classical view of the
judicial role' 4 has been replaced by a new set of norms that encourages
judges to intrude erratically during pretrial preparation and post-trial
(or post-decree) implementation.
Professor Resnik believes that new managerial responsibilities give
judges greater power and, at the same time, undermine the traditional
* Circuit Executive, United States Courts, Second Circuit. B.A., 1963, Haverford
College; M.A., 1965, Ph.D., 1970, Indiana University. I wish to thank Geoffrey Mort for
research assistance, and the many kind people who offered comments on previous drafts.
Among the latter are Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb, Judge Morris E. Lasker, Professor A.
Leo Levin, Professor Robert McKay, Thomas Olson, Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham, and
Judge Alvin B. Rubin.
I. Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 376, 380 (1982). Professor Resnik
has presented her arguments elsewhere. See, e.g., Resnik, ManagerialJudges and Court Delay: The Unproven Assumptions, 23 JUDGES J., Winter 1984, at 8.
2. Resnik, supra note 1, at 376 n.4. See infra note 45.
3. Resnik, supra note 1, at 376.
4. Id. It is not clear from Professor Resnik's article what the "classical judicial role"
is or was, as she does not specify a "classical" time or place, or any particular set of procedures. Apparently she understands classical judges to have been disinterested and
uninvolved. See id. at 376, 380-83. But see id. at 446-48 (Appendix entitled "The Iconography of Justice"). Because there are numerous references to Greece and Rome in this "iconography," it is possible that she intends the reader to take the term "classical judges"
literally.
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procedural safeguards against abuse of that power.5 "During pretrial
supervision, judges make many decisions informally and often meet'6
with parties ex parte, and appellate review is virtually unavailable."
Judges are also "at the center" of post-trial implementation. "They are
personally involved in the implementation of their decrees and in the
prospective planning of post-trial relations among the parties."' 7 In an
excess of understatement, Resnik observes that "[u]nreviewable power,
casual contact, and interest in outcome (or in aggregate outcomes) have
not traditionally been associated with the 'due process' decisionmaking
model."'8 She views management as a new procedural form of "judicial
activism" 9 that raises concerns at least as weighty as those ordinarily
voiced with regard to judicial activism of the substantive sort.
Professor Resnik also believes that "judicial management may be
teaching judges to value statistics rather than quality."10 Judicial management "has its own techniques, goals, and values, which appear to
elevate speed over deliberation, impartiality, and fairness."" According to Resnik, supervisory obligations give judges a "stake" in "effi5. Id. at 424-25.
6. Id at 413.
While it is true that pretrial case management is almost always unreviewable by appeal
in cases that do not result in a final judgment, there are important exceptions. For example,
awards of attorney's fees, certification of class actions, and settlement of class actions are
appealable. See Miller, An Overview ofFederal Class Actions: Past, Present,and Future, 4
JUST. SYS. J. 197, 198-99 (1978). Infrequently, a settlement is reviewable on appeal. See,
e.g., Jones v. Amalgamated Warbasse Houses, Inc., 721 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1983); Kline v.
Wolf, 702 F.2d 400 (2d Cir. 1983).
Further, Resnik fails to mention that there has long existed the mechanism of a complaint to the appropriate circuit judicial council. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d) (1982). It is my
understanding that this mechanism, available to any victim of abuse of pretrial management
power, has been relatively effective for the more than 40 years that it has existed. See generally S.
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35 (1978). This mechanism has now been supplemented by the procedures of the Judicial
Councils' Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980. See 28 U.S.C. § 372(c)
(Supp. V 1981). Mandamus review is also available. For a recent treatment, see Berger, The
MandamusPower ofthe United States CourtsoAppeals: A Complex and Confused Means of
Appellate Control, 31 BUFFALO L. REv. 37 (1982). Pretrial management, then, is reviewable
by appeal, by misconduct complaint, and by mandamus.
7. Resnik, supra note 1, at 391.
8. Id. at 430.
9. Id. at 380.
10. Id. As an example, Professor Resnik cites the collection of statistics compiled by
federal district judges regarding the number of cases terminated, number of motions decided, and number and type of "discrete events" supervised. She concludes that "case
processing is no longer viewed as a means to an end; instead, it appears to have become the
desired goal. Quantity has become all important; quality is occasionally mentioned and
then ignored." Id. at 430-31.
11. Id. at 424-25.
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cient" case management, as calculated by speed and number of
dispositions. "Competition and peer pressure may tempt judges to rush
12
litigants because of reasons unrelated to the merits of disputes."
These new managerial responsibilities and concerns about case loads
have led judges to employ "efficiency experts whQ promise 'calendar
control.' Under the experts' guidance, judges have begun to experiment with schemes for speeding the resolution of cases and for per-3
suading litigants to settle rather than try cases whenever possible."'
Since I am apparently one of those "efficiency experts,"' 4 I was not
pleased to learn that "managerial judging may be redefining sub silentio our standards of what constitutes rational, fair, and impartial
adjudication."' 5
In this Commentary, I wish to reassure Professor Resnik's readers,
as well as others who are interested in the direction of the civil litigation system. Resnik exagerates the extent of any judicial activity that is
inconsistent with due process. More important, she confuses genuinely
questionable approaches, which have long been understood to be questionable and thus are rare in practice, with established practices that
are generally recognized as acceptable and even essential. By muddling almost every managerial technique that a trial judge might use
with the special and well-understood concerns that attend an aggressive
judicial insistence on settlement, Resnik does a disservice: she suggests
that all judicial case management, however unexceptionable, is inconsistent with due process or with traditional images of justice. The corresponding service that she performs-focusing attention upon
important changes in the roles and responsibilities of trial judges- is
largely vitiated.
12. Id. at 427. In support of this broad assertion, Resnik seems to suggest that a statement made by Judge John D. Butzner, Jr., at a congressional hearing on judgeship needs
indicates that the judiciary gives unwarranted primacy to quantity over quality. Id at 427 &
n.198. This is a remarkable misrepresentation. In the rather desperate quest for additional
resources in which the judiciary has recently engaged, Congress has made it clear that demonstration of effective use of existing resources is a precondition to grants of further resources. The primary subject matter of judgeship hearings is inevitably quantitative, and
would be even if judges had no managerial responsibilities. For a judge or anyone else to
focus on the quality of court work would be inappropriate in this context.
13. Id. at 379.
14. It is a title I would hardly seek out. However, I am cited at least 20 times in Professor Resnik's article. See, e.g., id. at 378 n.14, 384 n.50, 399 n.100, 416 n.163; see also id. at
399 n.103, 404 n. 121, 431 n.217 (citations to work that I directed); id. at 398 (a reference to

my former employer, the Federal Judicial Center).
15. Id. at 380.
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Resnik's Hypothetical Models: Their Accuracy and Relevance
Professor Resnik's discussion of judicial case management focuses
primarily upon two facets of litigation: the new imperatives and roles
engendered by institutional reform litigation,16 and a supposed impera-17
tive to participate aggressively in settlement, perhaps by taking sides.
Less controversial activities like setting schedules, controlling discovery, and adjudicating motions, also appear to be implicated. 18
Professor Resnik's central error is that she builds her argument on
a foundation of two hypothetical "models." These models are the basis
of her "description" of what she understands to be "managerial judging." 9 This approach is disingenuous at best and is the primary target
of my criticism. The models permit Resnik to rest her argument upon a
factual basis that she has constructed herself, and frees her, apparently,
from any responsibility to demonstrate that the real world conforms to
her understanding of it.2o If the author demonstrated the factual accuracy of the models or their relevance to all of the judicial management
techniques she criticizes, her approach might be an acceptable rhetorical device.
Resnik's models by themselves demonstrate nothing. Her attack
on judicial case management fails because she provides no other evidence that case management powers are abused or have undesirable
side effects. My first objective is to show that these models either are
inadequate factual representations or are irrelevant, using the federal
courts as my focus, as Resnik says that she does. 2 ' I will then discuss
why judicial case management is essential and will briefly note the benefits of various managerial devices. Finally, I will explain why the
"classical" model that Professor Resnik proposes-as I understand it, a
system of "blind umpires"-is neither desirable nor feasible.
16. See id. at 387-88, 393-95. On this point, Professor Resnik draws heavily on Chayes,
The Role ofthe Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
17. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 388-93.
18. See, e.g., id. at 378 & n.14, where Resnik appears to cite as the subjects of her
attacks on case management several works, including my own. In fact, these works are
circumspect or discourage settlement activities, and primarily encourage other forms ofjudicial management. See infra note 37.
19. Resnik, supra note 1, at 386-87.
20. The article is filled with puzzling and meaningless statements such as "the models
demonstrate. . . "'see, e.g., id. at 403, and "the hypotheticals demonstrate. . . " see, e.g.,
id. at 411, and observations about what the hypothetical judges did or did not do and the
propriety or desirability of those actions, see, e.g., id. at 425.
21. See infra note 45.
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Post-trial Management in Institutional Reform Litigation
Resnik's hypothetical case of Petite v. Governor is a prisoner class
22
action concerning living conditions at "Hadleyville," a state prison.
The court found those living conditions to be constitutionally impermissible and ordered that they be upgraded. When defendants had
failed to comply with the order two years after it was filed, plaintiffs
filed a motion for contempt. Because of the state's intransigence, Judge
Breaux is drawn deeply into the case in the familiar ways: she meets
many times with both sides, issues several interim orders that specify
necessary improvements, is forced to threaten the governor with contempt, then actually finds him in contempt once and imposes a fine of
five hundred dollars per day.2 3 "No longer a detached oracle, the judge
has become a consort of the litigants. Moreover, judges like the fic'24
tional Breaux become openly involved in a power struggle.
It is well known and understood that trial judges are thrust into a
new role in cases in which acrimonious litigation continues for years
over the implementation of a decree ordering a prison, state hospital,
school, or other institution to comply with constitutional imperatives.2 5
Indeed, by its nature "post-trial" management is limited to these institutional reform settings, and thus to a very small proportion of all civil
cases.2 6 These cases are so few, their circumstances so specialized, and
the unique participatory role they impose on judges so well understood
that it is unnecessary to do anything more drastic than find mecha-7
2
nisms for facilitating judges' work in these uncomfortable situations.
However, as many as thirty-two states have prisons that are or
have been under court orders,28 and there are numerous orders and
decrees regarding other kinds of institutions. It is significant that Professor Resnik believes that judges' actions in these big equity cases cast
doubt on their roles in other managerial activities. Perhaps we should
Resnik, supra note 1, at 387.
Id. at 387-88.
Id. at 391.
See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 16.
Of a total of 231,920 cases pending in the federal courts as of June 30, 1983, AD.
OFF. U.S. COURTS, 1983 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 241 (1983) (Table C-i), an
insignificant percentage were major institutional reform cases.
27. A good deal has been done in this area already, especially by the Federal Judicial
Center. See Nathan, The Use of Masters in InstitutionalReform Litigation, 10 TOLEDO L.
REV. 419 (1979); see also Chayes, The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, Foreword-Public Law
Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1979).
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

28. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES FOUND., NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT STATUS REPORT:
COURTS AND PRISONS 1-7 (1983).
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overcome our aversion to creating specialized forums, 29 or should
search for a separate approach that could serve as a lightning rod for
the criticism that these cases inevitably draw. Maybe we should separate law from equity.3 0 In any event, the issues surrounding institutional reform cases are utterly separate from those of "pretrial"
management. We can solve the special problems these extraordinary
cases pose or fail to solve them, remove them to another forum or keep
techthem where they are, without affecting in the least the issues3 of
1
nique in managing the course of conventional civil litigation.
Indeed, having raised in some detail the spectre of post-trial managerial abuses, Professor Resnik appears to summarily discount the
threat. She concedes: "Unlike pretrial management, post-trial activity
occurs within a framework of appellate oversight, public visibility, and
institutional constraints that inhibits overreaching. Post-trial supervision thus represents a less striking departure from the American judicial tradition than does pretrial management. ' 32 The reader is left to
wonder why Resnik dwells on the institutional reform cases, and to
what extent her preoccupation with these exceptional cases has contributed to her distrust of other managerial activities.
Managing Case Preparation and Encouraging Settlements
The hypothetical case of Paulson v. Danforth3 3 is apparently intended to represent pretrial judicial management activities in civil cases
generally.3 4 Paulson is a products liability suit arising out of an automobile crash. Following quick resolution of an early jurisdictional dis29. See, e.g., remarks of Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals before the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration
ofJustice (Sept. 22, 1983), reprintedinN.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1983, at I (full text on file with the
author).
30. There would be some logic in doing so as a latter day reassertion of the historical
basis of the equity courts as direct representatives of the king. Indeed, critics of judges'
actions in institutional reform cases make unflattering comparisons to assertions of royal
prerogatives. See, e.g., Glazer, Towards an ImperialJudiciary, 41 THE PUB. INTEREST 105
(1975). For a discussion of the origin of equity courts, see generally 1 F. LAWRENCE, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

(1929). But whatever the problems and solutions may be, they are

utterly separate from those of post-trial management in the course of conventional civil
litigation.
31. See infra notes 48-59 & accompanying text.
32. Resnik, supra note 1, at 414.
33. Id. at 388.
34. See, e.g., id. at 425. Also, Resnik describes the Paulson case as "run-of-the-mill."
Id. at 386. I would not choose to describe any products liability suit in this way, and certainly not this one: the stakes are considerable and there are substantial legal and factual
uncertainties.
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pute, plaintiff makes a number of demanding discovery requests that
are resisted and that raise numerous questions of fact and strategy. At
a preliminary conference, called by Judge Kinser because the discovery
motions trouble him, the judge seems to tire of the lawyers' wrangling
and suddenly presses the lawyers for a settlement. He does so in a
determined fashion that includes separate meetings with each side, a
suggestion that the plaintiffs case looks "sound," and discussion of a
specific settlement figure suggested by the judge. Nothing is resolved,
except that the judge defers ruling on the motions until the parties negotiate further. Another conference is set for six weeks later.35
There is no evidence that the Paulson case reflects anything other
than Professor Resnik's imagination, though I would not claim that it is
so implausible that nothing like it could happen. When Resnik later
addresses the issues generated from her second model, she appears to
have been blinded by concerns over potential abuse of judicial powers
in efforts to encourage or to force settlements-a blindness incorporated in the model. 36 Were the practices of federal trial judges in settlement matters even distantly related to Resnik's understanding of them,
there might indeed be a serious problem. In fact, even the sources that
she uses suggest a more reassuring picture.3 7 In general, federal judges
are circumspect and selective in their discussions of settlement. 38 It is
my experience that virtually all are keenly aware of the dangers Resnik
identifies, dangers that have been widely discussed and understood for
39
many years.
35. Id. at 388-90.
36. Although in her discussion of the Paulson model Resnik mentions other aspects of
judicial management, such as discovery, it is apparent that her thesis revolves around the
issue of settlement. See, e.g., id. at 390, 401-02, 406. Indeed, Resnik makes the remarkable
assertion that "the whole point of pretrial management is to end the dispute as rapidly as
possible." Id. at 406.
37. See, e.g., P. CONNOLLY & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DISCOVERY 56-57 (1978) (exhaustively treating the methods of controlling discovery abuse without discussing settlement) (cited in Resnik, supra note 1, at 443
n.270); S. FLANDERS, CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS 37-39 (1977) (discouraging routine settlement discussions,
describing the practice as uncommon) (cited in Resnik, supra note I, at 378 n.14); Peckham,
The FederalJudge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case From Filing to
Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 770, 780 (1981) (defining the "new role" in entirely other
Abuse and Correcterms) (cited in Resnik, supra note 1, at 378 n.14); Pollack, Discover;--Its
tion, 80 F.R.D. 219, 224 (1978) (treating settlement as only part of the solution) (cited in
Resnik, supra note 1, at 402 n. 114).
38. See generally materials cited supra note 37.
39. See H. WILL, R. MERHIGE & A. RUBIN, THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 16 (1977).
The notion that judicial settlement conferences present special issues is hardly a new
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Most judges regard their primary role in the settlement process as

that of an indirect facilitator.40 It is my impression from my experience
that actual settlement figures are discussed only by a minority of
judges, and then only under carefully structured conditions. Noting
that most cases settle or are otherwise resolved short of trial, Judge
Alvin B. Rubin urges that settlement efforts by judges be highly selective and subject to the initiative of the lawyers involved.4 1 Even Judge
one. That notion was delightfully highlighted by Professor A. Leo Levin over 30 years ago
in a review of Harry D. Nims' work of remarkably enthusiastic and undifferentiated advocacy, Pre-Trial. Published under the sponsorship of the Committee on Pretrial Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States and of the Council of the Section on Judicial
Administration of the American Bar Association, the book seemed to favor almost any variety of pretrial activity, in a fashion that seems to foreshadow Professor Resnik's undifferentiated opposition to all judicial management. Professor Levin noted that "Mr. Nms seems so
intent on getting people to use pre-trial that the kind of pre-trial they use seems no concern
of his." Levin, Book Review, 37 IOWA L. REv. 136, 138 (1951) (reviewing H. NIMS, PRETRIAL (1950)). Professor Levin then excerpted the following astonishing colloquy, which
Nims had in turn excerpted:
from the transcript of a conference in an actual case brought by a housewife to
recover for injuries sustained when a bus in which she was a passenger crashed into
a truck. Hospital records and doctor bills having been submitted, counsel for
plaintiff stated that suit was for $7500. He then was asked by the court to leave.
Brief discussion of how the accident occurred is followed by:
"Mr. Weeks: [for the truck owners] We will rest on the statement that we were
struck from the rear. I will offer only a nominal sum-$100.
Mr. Justice McNally: Will you increase your offer?
Mr. Weeks: I will offer $200.
Mr. Justice McNally: Make it $250.
Mr. Justice McNally: I have reviewed the medical record, and I think the case is
worth $3,000. There is no question some one or both are liable.
Mr. Cole: [for the bus company] I am disposed to follow your Honor's recommendation in this matter.
Mr. Justice McNally: I will talk to Mr. Brandt, [attorney for plaintiff]. The attorneys for both defendants step outside. Mr. Brandt re-enters."
Id. (quoting H. NIMS, supra, at 238-39). An auction process like this, apparently in the
absence of any showing of liability, would disturb Professor Resnik, or any of us, whether or
not the judge in question was actually likely to be the trial judge in the case (the judge in this
case was not). It disturbed Professor Levin 30 years ago. See id. at 139. If Resnik believes
that the settlement conference is misused in the federal courts today in a way similar to
Nims' case, and the facts of the Paulson case seem to indicate that she does, she should offer
a basis for that belief before constructing a model to be used as a starting point for an attack
on all pretrial judicial case management.
40. Judge Alvin B. Rubin, for example, took a circumspect approach to settlement
when he focused a presentation to new district court judges on the elimination of uncertainty, ie., the salutary effect of a definite trial date on the settlement process. PROCEEDINGS
OF SEMINAR FOR NEWLY APPOINTED UNITED STATES DIsTRIcT JUDGES 135 (1976). See
also Rubin, The Managed Calendar:Some PragmaticSuggestionsAbout Achieving the Just,
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JusT. SYS. J. 135
(1978) (placing little emphasis on settlement).
41. H. WILL, R. MERHIGE & A. RUBIN, supra note 35, at 18-19.
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Hubert L. Will, an enthusiastic advocate of routine settlement conferences, tells us that "I have never set, on my own initiative, a settlement
'42
conference."
While most federal judges are alert to the risks created by their
involvement in the settlement process, they also are, and must be, sensitive to the obstacles to settlement sometimes imposed by the adversary
relationship. Many judges are determined to take advantage of opportunities the court may have to facilitate settlement. As Judge Will put
it, "there are a lot of cases in which a settlement can be achieved only
through the intervention of a third party who has objectivity, who has
no stake in either side of the case, who has no prestige involved, and
who is ultimately prepared to try the case if necessary. ' 43 Seen in this
light, judicial involvement in settlement efforts is something no sensible
44
person could quarrel with if the dangers are handled appropriately.
Of course, I do not purport to prove that the dangers are handled appropriately in all cases. My point is that Resnik has failed to show that
these dangers are not handled appropriately; she thus cannot justify her
inclusion of Judge Kinser's excessive settlement involvement in the
Paulson model as representative behavior.4 5
We must also remind ourselves that encouraging settlements is a
policy problem of paramount importance. In a system founded upon
the adversary relationship, in which lawyers are trained to fight, not to
negotiate, 46 suggestion of settlement is often taken as a sign of weakness. A settlement is in many respects the closest thing to a truly final
42. Id. at 8.
43. Id. at 8-9.
44. Normally, a case would be sent to another judge for trial ifa judge has participated
as deeply in the settlement process as the Paulson case's Judge Kinser did-itself an unlikely
event in my experience.
45. Professor Resnik's failure here is exemplified by the confusion stemming from her
curious research methods. She claims to speak primarily, even exclusively, about federal
practice, yet much of the evidence adduced concerning judicial settlement efforts and activity comes from a single source that describes a state procedure 15 years ago in a single
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 1, at 399 n.106. Resnik's confusion may be due to
the fact that the author of that single source, Aldisert, A Metropolitan Court ConquersIts
Backlog, 51 JUDICATURE 247 (1968) (cited in Resnik, supra note 1, at 379 n.18), is presently
a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. While a judge
of the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Judge Aldisert helped to develop pioneering techniques to deal with court congestion. Though active in
matters involving training and policy making within the fedral courts, Judge Aldisert has
never advocated--to my knowledge-settlement activities in the federal courts that could
serve as the basis for Resnik's Paulson model.
46. See, e.g., Address by Derek Bok, President of Harvard University, at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York Annual Benjamin Cardozo Lecture (Nov. 9, 1982),
reprintedin 38 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 12 (1983).
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judgment that can emerge from litigation. A settlement is not normally

appealable, and it normally embodies a commitment by the parties to
work together in some manner, a stance that may forestall future litigation. Thus, while Professor Resnik is correct in reminding us that judi-

cial settlement efforts can get judges into trouble and that not all
settlement approaches work,47 it does not follow that efforts to en-

courage and achieve just settlements should be rolled back or even
slowed down. In any event, Resnik's unsupported misconceptions of
the nature and scope of judicial involvement in the settlement process
in the federal courts renders her second model as useless as her first
model, if not more.

The Core of Managerial Activism
As I deny that Professor Resnik accurately describes what "managerial judges" do, it must fall to me to correct the picture. Why, and in
what ways, do federal judges commit their valuable time to the "management" of cases before them? I submit that the subjects of Resnik's
two models, institutional reform cases and aggressive settlement efforts,
are marginal examples of management activity. There are relatively
few institutional reform cases, and few judges use aggressive settlement
tactics. Working in a complex world that yields many different types of
cases, federal judges have established appropriately diverse procedures
that are individually tailored to accomodate different circumstances
and policy preferences, as well as local legal practices and expectations. 48 These practices include: 1) mechanisms to screen cases early
for jurisdictional or recusal problems; 2) tailor-made schedules that will
bring each case to the earliest possible resolution; 3) close supervision
47. Professor Resnik correctly observes that "empirical moorings are wanting; no data
firmly support the conclusion that judicial intervention results in more settlements than
would otherwise have occurred." Resnik, supra note 1, at 421. By again focusing on settlement, Resnik ignores the fact that advocates ofjudicial management avoid settlement activity partly because it can be a questionable use of time. See supra notes 40-41. She asks:
On any given day, are four judges who speak with parties on sixteen lawsuits and
report that twelve of those cases ended without trial more "productive" than four
judges who preside at four trials? Is it relevant to an assessment of "productivity"
that three of these four trials are settled after ten days of testimony?
Resnik, supra note 1, at 422. I would suggest, incidentally, that these hypothetical numbers
are unrealistic, and weighted against the productivity benefits of settlement efforts. It would
be unthinkable for a judge devoting an entire day to settlement efforts to deal with only four
cases; forty would be closer to the mark.
48. What follows is drawn largely from data and personal experience that I have reported on previously. See S. FLANDERS, supra note 37, at ix-xi, 17-41; see also Flanders,
Case Management in Federal Courts: Some Controversiesand Some Results, 4 JusT. SYS. J.
147 (1978). These works are cited repeatedly by Professor Resnik.

January 1984]

JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT

of discovery4 9; and 4) the well-known components of rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before its recent modification, 50 that
bear on the scope and conduct of the trial.
In summarizing the diverse mechanisms used by judges and their
staffs in the management of civil cases, one should distinguish the complex cases (e.g., many securities, patent, or antitrust cases, and class

actions) from the more routine contract disputes, personal injury matters, and small-scale disputes involving government agencies (e.g., social security and tax cases) that predominate in the ordinary litigation
environment. Both complex and routine cases are managed extensively, but different mechanisms are involved.

The complex suit normally gets substantial individual attention
from judges and their staffs, who vigorously try to keep the scope of the
lawsuit manageable. A tight schedule is set and maintained, though it
may be frequently adjusted. There may be many conferences, and perhaps dozens of formal rulings, as the focus moves from the pleadings
(Who's in the case? Is there a case? If not, could there be? What court,
if any, has jurisdiction?), to discovery (What's relevant? What's privileged? What are the issues, anyway?), to resolving the case by settle-

ment, motion, or trial. The less complex case will get more routinized
treatment, subject to adjustment in light of subsequent events. Nor-

mally a schedule is established early, sometimes at a preliminary conference, more often by the judge, courtroom clerk, or magistrate acting

alone.5 1 Time limits are set for completing discovery, holding a final
49. This is in response to what is probably the most widespread and urgent policy
concern today about the way that the litigation system functions. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26
Notes of Advisory Committee at 70-79 (1982); P. CONNOLLY & M. KUHLMAN, supra note
37,passim; NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 41 (1979); Liman, Remarks at the
AnnualJudicialConference of the Second Circuit,May 8, 1981, 93 F.R.D. 675, 715-19 (1982).

50. Rule 16 was amended as of August 1, 1983. The amendments entail a number of
revisions, two being of primary importance. First, the amendments introduce the concept of
a preliminary pretrial conference to discuss the disposition of pending motions, formulation
of the issues, and like matters. The provisions in old rule 16 for a final pretrial conference to
formulate a plan for trial are left intact. Second, the amendments in effect make the process
of pretrial case management a mandatory one in federal district courts. See FED. R. Civ. P.
16 (Discussion Draft 1982).
51. Some activity along these lines is now mandated by amended rule 16. See supra
note 50. Professor Resnik muddles her discussions of this type of managerial activity because she calls the early scheduling orders mandated by amended rule 16 "pretrial orders."
See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 1, at 401. Ordinarily I would not carp about her choice of
words, in the belief that she is free to call anything that she wishes a pretrial order. However, her argument at this point is only apposite if it is taken as referring to something more
substantial than a piece of paper with four or five dates on it, which as I understand it is all
the amendment requires. A case that is in the uncertain status ofPaulson v. Danforth would
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pretrial conference, and trial. Typically, few problems arise that re-

quire court intervention.
An additional dimension of managerial activism in both complex
and "routine" cases is the manner and extent of a judge's use of the
array of control mechanisms provided by the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, mechanisms that normally must be initiated by a party and
not the judge.5 2 Further, the class action under rule 23 involves the
judge in several crucial managerial decisions.5 3 The broad judicial responsibilities established by these rules indicate that they were not
designed to implement a model of the judicial role that contemplated
the judge knowing nothing before trial of the parties' strategies, theo-

ries, past dealings with one another, or underlying facts.
These management mechanisms generally present few problems
relevant to Professor Resnik's concerns, 54 and it is no mystery why

judges and their staffs believe these tools are essential.5 5 Substantial

data indicate that a modest degree of control greatly reduces the time
during which a case is pending.5 6 Consider, for example, the following
not be adversely affected by the issuance of a scheduling order that might turn out to be
meaningless if it is overtaken by events. Resnik could sensibly argue that it would be irrational to require preparation, at so early and uncertain a stage, of anything resembling the
pretrial orders that are now filed at a much later stage of the case. She does not. Furthermore, I believe that that is neither the intent of the amendment to rule 16 nor the likely
result.
52. These include sanctions, summary judgment, attacks on the pleadings, and arrangements for fact-finding by a special master.
53. These include class certification and approval of settlements. See generally Miller,
supra note 6.
54. These mechanisms have nothing to do with post-trial management or settlement
pressures.
55. There is some mystery to Professor Resnik, however. She holds the curious notion
that doctrines supporting trial court case management somehow owe their antecedents to
appellate court management issues and developments. See Resnik, supra note 1, at 417-18.
I know of no evidence that supports Resnik's assertion, and she does not provide any evidence. If anything, I would say that the opposite is true. Resnik disregards the obvious
tradition that does exist, beginning with the concerns about expeditious procedure that led to
the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the first place, see, e.g., Clark &
Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387 (1935), continuing through the
vigorous activity to extend and encourage the use of pretrial mechanisms, see S. FLANDERS,
supra note 37, at 147-50, and leading to the more recent institutional efforts of the Federal
Judicial Center, the General Accounting Office, and the Judicial Conference of the United
States, see, e.g., P.CoNNOLLY & A. LOMBARD, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980) (part of the Federal Judicial Center's District Court Study
Series); GEN. AccT. OFF., BETTER MANAGEMENT CAN EASE FEDERAL CIVIL BACKLOG:
REPORT TO CONGRESS OF THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1981);
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 1214 (1982).
56. Professor Resnik has considerable difficulty handling data on court operations.
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tables drawn from a study that I directed of civil cases that were termiFirst, she makes a great many mistaken references to data that are or are not available. She
asserts, for example, that "[b]efore 1904, no nationwide information was kept about the
number of civil cases filed in federal court." Resnik, supra note 1, at 416 n.161. This would
be news to Professor Landes and Judge Posner, who have made inventive use of the reports
of the Attorney General that were prepared annually in the 19th century. See, e.g., Landes
& Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoreticaland EmpiricalAnaysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 283
(1976). Despite the frequency of quasi-quantitative language in her article (e.g., "tally,"
"sometimes," see Resnik, supra note I, at 405-406), Resnik ignores the massive data resources found in the Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of United
States Courts. This and related publications answer questions suggested but not dealt with
throughout her article.
Resnik cites testimony by a chief judge about his own court in support of the proposition that "statistics indicate that the interval from filing to appeal has decreased in most
circuits." Resnik, supra note I, at 418 (quoting Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg). Although
her point here is not clear, it appears she is concerned about disposition times for appeals.
Most United States Courts of Appeals are slightly slower than they have been in either the
recent past, see, e.g., MANAGEMENT STATISTICS IN UNITED STATES COURTS 15 (1983) (for
the years 1978-1983), or the more distant past, see, e.g., AD. OFF. U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR Table B-4 (1953, 1963, 1973, 1983, or intervening years).
Professor Resnik misreads Professor Lawrence Friedman's The Six Million DollarMan:
Litigation andRights Consciousnessin Modern America, 39 MD. L. REv. 661 (1980), as questioning in some fashion relevant to her concerns whether real litigation rates have increased.
See Resnik, supra note 1, at 396 & n.85 (citing Friedman, supra, at 363). Since Resnik
directs her concern almost exclusively to the federal courts, it would have been helpful for
her to note Friedman's observation, made one page before the point that she references, that
"[o]ne thing is clear litigation, and litigation rates are rising in federal courts. . . absolutely
and relative to population." Friedman, supra, at 662. Resnik makes a similar error when
she quotes a reference by Professor Friedman to his state court statistics as though his observations were relevant to "difficulties in interpreting the statistics provided by the Administrative Office [of the United States Courts]." Resnik, supra note 1, at 419 n.175.
At several points Professor Resnik confuses settlement efforts, and settlements, with the
substantial number of cases that are disposed of by either motions for summary judgment or
motions that attack the pleadings. For example, she quotes "warnings" about the dangers of
coerced settlement and adds what she intends as an example, a reported decision that reversed a district judge who had granted summary judgment. Id. at 402 n.l 15 (discussing
Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1977)). Whatever this case is an
example of, it has little to do with coerced settlement. She writes elsewhere as though she
believes that every case that does not reach trial is settled. See, e.g., id. at 385 n.53, 405
("eighty-five to ninety percent of all federal civil suits end by settlement"). But see id. at 405
n.127 (indicating some understanding of the situation). Of approximately 3000 civil cases in
six districts that were surveyed and coded for the District Court Studies Project of the Federal Judicial Center, 32.2% were disposed of by motion. P. CONNOLLY & A. LOMBARD,
supra note 55, at Table 23. Since the percentage of civil cases reaching trial has not reached
10% in recent years, we can conclude that no more than about 60% of all federal civil cases
are settled.
Professor Resnik incorrectly paraphrases the chief judge of my own circuit as indicating
that his court "decided virtually all appeals within six months of submission." Resnik, supra
note 1, at 418 & n.171 (citingAdditional JudicialPositions:HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on
Courts of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1981) (statement of
Chief Judge Wilfred Feinberg)). The statement in question referred to the time fromfling.
Although this is a difference of only a single word, the result is a difference of a factor of
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nated in six large courts in 1975. 57 Table I shows the six courts studied;

58
they appear in rough order of degree of managerial activism utilized,

as described above.

TABLE 1
Overall Disposition Times
Fiscal 1975
All cases
sampled
Median
(days)
121
S.D. Fla.
C.D. Cal .... 166
D. Md ....... 223
313
E.D. La ....
E.D. Pa...... 352
500
D. Ma .......

Routine
personal tort

Routine
contract

Complex
contract

Constitutional
law

Nun- Median Num- Median Num- Median Num- Median Num(days)
ber
(days)
ber
ber
(days)
ber
bet
(days)
scases)
(case(ca
(cases)
(cases)
(cases)
595
541
502
494
497
468

202
323
291
341
400
689

53
41
98
200
183
113

139
176
205
305
254
331

119
48
57
19
58
46.

142
294
239
335
359
704

111
84
49
44
65
67

96
334
235
212
305
485

28
38
38
23
37
37

Prisoner
petitions
Median
(days)

Number
(cases)

70
77
112
72
121
173

63
133
127
24
39
44

For a subset of the same data base, Table 2 shows the experience of
on. This
individual judges, without regard to the court the judge served
59

table treats only cases for which some discovery was done.

possibly as much as 18, as the median time from submission to decision for the year in
question was 10 days. Filing of a notice of appeal in a district court is, of course, the event
that initiates an appeal. Submission, which follows preparation and filing of all briefs and
nearly all motions, is the date of oral argument or of submission for a decision on the briefs.
AD. OFF. U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 363 (1980) (Table B-4).
57. S. FLANDERS, supra note 37. This work is only one example of a long effort by the
judiciary to determine the effects of alternative procedures and to keep track of different
types of cases individually. Professor Resnik makes numerous assertions that this practice is
new, suggesting, for example, that only now has the judiciary achieved "enhanced accountability." Resnik, supra note 1, at 416. On the contrary, in 1940 the Judicial Conference of the
United States required all federal district judges to prepare a quarterly listing of cases and
motions under advisement for 60 days or more. These reports have since been used regularly by the judicial councils of the circuits. Indeed, what was known--significantly-as the
Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics, Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, headed for much of the 1940s and 1950s by Will Shafroth, was the source of a series
of initiatives during those years to encourage effective case management. It is interesting to
note that the statistics system itself was largely based upon earlier work of the Chairman of
the Judicial Conference Committee on Statistics from 1946 to 1958, Judge Charles E. Clark.
Judge Clark, of course, was a prime author of the federal rules themselves when he was
Dean of the Yale Law School. See Clark & Moore, supra note 55. The joint stewardship of
Judge Clark and Mr. Shafroth was highly productive--so the close identification of statistics
with procedural studies is hardly new.
58. S. FLANDERS, supra note 37, at 19.
59. P. CONNOLLY & M. KUHLMAN, supra note 37, at 68.
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TABLE 2
Total Disposition Time by Extent of
Judge Control and by Disposition Type
(Average Days)
Disposition
Type
Settled
Tried

Judges Using
Strong Controls

Judges Using
Limited or No Controls

366
472

682
945

These tables show extraordinarily wide differences as a result of
case management and indicate that delay in civil cases is substantially
controllable. Professor Resnik, unfortunately, makes little or no effort
to respond to these or other data on this point, though she uses their
60
sources a great deal.
As a final point, it is worth noting that there is a substantial demand by the bar for managerial activism on the part of judges and
their staffs. 6 1 When the Advisory Committee on Planning for the District Courts of the Second Circuit Judicial Council recently examined
case management procedures in that circuit, it concluded:
Indeed, among the attorneys we interviewed, there was general
agreement that a judge should play an active role in the litigation
process. Perhaps even more strongly than judges, many of the attorneys stressed the importance of early and aggressive judicial intervention, noting that without continual prompting and monitoring by
60. Since Professor Resnik does not indicate why she ignores the evidence in the
sources cited supra note 37, I have no basis for undertaking a response. I will speculate, for
the benefit of my social science colleagues, about the contours of a methodological debate
that she may have engaged me in, and suggest the following.
Those studies, which Professor Resnik correctly notes were relied upon by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules as well as several of her other sources, were designed with the
understanding that rigorous and controlled experimentation is sometimes impractical in the
trial court environment. The effort, rather, was to determine and inventory the management
principles that distinguish the courts that have particularly speedy disposition times or particularly high rates of terminations per judge, from those courts that are particularly slow or
have low rates. We found that while the results varied widely, it was not hard to identify
common elements.
Without attempting to summarize the findings here, I will state that they indicate the
success of the kinds of management I have noted to be common, though not the kinds that
Professor Resnik directly criticizes, such as settlement pressure. Whatever the methodological imperfections of an admittedly imperfect approach, it must be presumed that the procedures of the fast/efficient courts effectively contribute to this speed or efficiency. The
burden, then, must rest on others to show that these results are fortuitous or otherwise
wrong, or to show that they are harmful. Resnik, for all her criticism, fails to assume that
burden. I am satisfied, as many are, that these procedures improve quality. See, e.g., S.
FLANDERS, supra note 37, at 68-70.
61. See supra note 48.
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the judge, 62the pretrial stage of most cases would drag on
indefinitely.

It is telling that the practitioners who are paid to zealously protect the
rights and interests of their clients do not share Resnik's fears.
Why We Cannot Have Blind Umpires
Professor Resnik, it appears, seeks a return to what she calls a
"classical view of the judicial role," a system in which judges know
little or nothing of the cases they try.63 She is far more radical than she
imagines in suggesting so thorough a re-assertion of an "umpireal"
role,64 or what I call a system of blind umpires. Even if trial judges are
removed from all the components of case management that are discretionary, they will be far from uninformed. In a criminal trial, they will
know a great deal about any evidence that was suppressed. In a class
action, they will be familiar with the strategy and financing of the suit,
as well as the hidden agendas the lawyers may have. In many cases,
earlier decisions they have made regarding injunctions, motions to
strike, and motions for summary judgment will have informed them
substantially. It is hard to believe that Resnik means for us to do away
with all of these devices along with the discretionary devices. Even
should she desire merely to move them to another judge, this would be
no solution because many cities have only one federal judge available
at a particular time.
The desire for a naive judge is not only fantasy, it is foolish. On
the bench, the trial judge must rely on broad knowledge of the action at
bar. For example, I am told that the most common issue in evidentiary
rulings is relevance. 6 5 Ruling requires knowledge of the lawyers' strategies, and the full contour of the case being developed. There simply is
no reason to impoverish the judicial process by vain pursuit of an ideal
that Professor Resnik believes once obtained in our past.
62. U.S. Second Circuit Advisory Comm. on Planning for the District Courts, Report
of Subcommittee on the Role of the Judiciary (1981) (unpublished report) (on file with the
author). Members of the subcommittee were Robert B. McKay, Chairman, then Director of
the Institute for Judicial Administration; United States District Judges John T. Curtin, Lee
P. Gagliardi, and Eugene H. Nickerson; and New York attorneys Milton Handler, Arthur L.
Liman and Lawrence Pedowitz.
63. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note I, at 424-36.
64. Address by Judge Marvin E. Frankel at the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York Annual Benjamin Cardozo Lecture (Dec. 16, 1974), reprintedin 30 REc. A.B.
CrrY N.Y. 14 (1975). See also Frankel, The Adversary Judge, 54 TEX. L. REv. 465 (1976).
65. Personal conversation with Chief Judge Barbara B. Crabb, Western District for
Wisconsin, April 12, 1983. I am indebted to Chief Judge Crabb for the view put forward in
this paragraph generally.
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Oddly, Professor Resnik overlooks a very convenient model for
radical change along these lines that might be worth exploring. The
Master system in England, described by Professor Linda Silberman,
appears to offer the isolation of trial from "improper" influences that
Resnik desires, in combination with firm court control over each lawsuit.66

Though Silberman shows that the responsibilities of Masters

differ greatly from their closest American analogue, the federal magistrates, it may be that she has identified a basis for radical reform. Pos-

sibly a refashioning of the magistrate system along English lines would
accomplish some of Resnik's purpose. Since it is a reform I would oppose for reasons that I have given already, however, I am not the one to
explore this in detail.
Professor Resnik has done her readers a modest service by reminding them of certain well-known problems in judicial case management. There may be pernicious pressures due to judges' concern about
staying abreast of heavy case loads. Energetic judicial involvement in
settlement negotiation and frequent pretrial contacts on the part of
judges do pose certain dangers. These are indeed important issues.
But Resnik does her readers a remarkable disservice by overstating one
67
problem and lumping together all forms of judicial case management.
66. Silberman, Masters andMagistrates-TheEnglish Model, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070
(1975). Resnik cites the Silberman piece in a footnote, but does not address the proposal.
See Resnik, supra note 1, at 436 & n.239.
67. I have heard judges say that the purpose of the trial court is the search for truth,
while the purpose of the appellate court is the search for error. Regrettably, my present task
seems to have demanded a bit of the latter activity, as Professor Resnik's article is riddled
with instances of muddled logic, misreading of sources, and misunderstanding of the issues
treated.
In addition to those errors already noted, she coins the term "repeat adjudicators" for
judges who handle fact-finding in cases in which they have participated in pretrial management. Resnik, supra note I, at 429. Here again, Resnik is free to use whatever term she
wishes. For her justification, id. at 429 n.208, however, she draws upon Professor Galanter's
interesting but irrelevant work on repeat litigants, Why The "Haves" Come Out 4head"Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 95 (1974). With repeat litigants, of course, the point is that they have special advantages in the litigative process as a
result of their bargaining power because they are involved in many other cases, past, present,
and future, that must be kept in mind as they develop strategy for any present case. Resnik
is concerned with "repeat" experience in one case, Galanter with the very different matter of
repeat, cumulative experience over many cases.
Professor Resnik also makes a serious error of logic in her use of the cliche that the
lawyer who handles his own case "has a fool for a client." Resnik, supra note 1, at 426. To
Resnik, this somehow offers a basis for arguing that judges are not qualified to determine
policies in their courts. Of course a judge who handled his own case, as trial judge or in any
other way, would have for a client not only a fool but a candidate for impeachment. Presumably, Resnik has in mind a very different assertion that is in no way implied by the
"fool for a client" locution. She means to argue, I take it, that judges are not well qualified
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This confusion causes Resnik's models to be fatally flawed and renders
her attacks based on these models marginally useful at best. The
steady expansion of judicial case management since the original adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has certainly added new
components to the judicial role. But it has yet to be shown that judges
have abandoned any essential attributes of their judicial role as they
help manage the pace and cost of litigation.

in principle to formulate policy regarding management of their own professional activities. I
am not aware of any persuasive argument to this effect; indeed, such an argument would be
contrary to what most understand to be the very nature of professional activity. See generall , E. FRIEDSON, DOCTORING TOGETHER: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL
(1976); W. MOORE, PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES (1970); W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONS:
RATIONAL, NATURAL AND OPEN SYSTEMS (1981). She offers no reason to disturb the belief
held by many of us that judges are uniquely informed by experience (prior to appointment
and on the bench), personal refinement of their individual procedures, and policy contacts
with practitioners at judicial conferences and bar conferences, to develop and refine the
management of the very complex and diverse institutions over which they precide. While
judges (or practicing lawyers and scholars) may benefit from cross-fertilization from other
professions, there is certainly no dearth of outside advice and experience in management of
the federal judiciary. The work of the present author is only one indication of this.

